

**FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF ETHIOPIA**

**MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE**

**ETHIOPIA LOCUST EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROJECT ADDITIONAL FINANCING I (ELERP AF I)**

**SECURITY MANAGEMENT PLAN (SMP)**

**October 2022**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

**Table of Contents**

[Acronyms iv](#_Toc105355444)

[Executive Summary 1](#_Toc105355445)

[Objective of the SMP: 2](#_Toc105355446)

[Components and sub components of the project 2](#_Toc105355447)

[National Polices and Legal Frameworks 3](#_Toc105355448)

[Ethiopian Relevant Laws and Regulations 4](#_Toc105355449)

[The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework Requirement 5](#_Toc105355450)

[Security Context in Ethiopia 6](#_Toc105355451)

[Potential Security Risks Identification 6](#_Toc105355452)

[**Suggested security risks Mitigation Measures** 7](#_Toc105355453)

[1. Introduction 9](#_Toc105355454)

[1.1. General Background of the Project 9](#_Toc105355455)

[1.2. Objective of the SMP: 10](#_Toc105355456)

[2. Components and sub components of the project 11](#_Toc105355457)

[2.1. Project Framework 14](#_Toc105355458)

[2.2. Project Target Areas 14](#_Toc105355459)

[3. Methodology 16](#_Toc105355460)

[4. Legal and Institutional Frame work 16](#_Toc105355461)

[4.1. National Polices and Legal Frameworks 16](#_Toc105355462)

[4.1.1. The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) 17](#_Toc105355463)

[4.2. Ethiopian Relevant Laws and Regulations 19](#_Toc105355464)

[4.2.2. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy (2002), 20](#_Toc105355465)

[4.3. The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework Requirement 20](#_Toc105355466)

[4.4. Standards and good international practices 24](#_Toc105355467)

[4.5. Relevant institutions involved in security management 24](#_Toc105355468)

[5. Security Risk Assessment 25](#_Toc105355469)

[5.1. Security Context in Ethiopia 25](#_Toc105355470)

[5.2. Project Areas Security Risk 26](#_Toc105355471)

[6. Potential Security Risks Identification, evaluation, rating and mitigation measures 27](#_Toc105355472)

[6.1. Potential Security Risks Identification 27](#_Toc105355473)

[6.2 Security Risk Analysis and Evaluation 28](#_Toc105355474)

[6.3. Security Risk rating and prioritization 28](#_Toc105355475)

[6.4 Risk level versus priority 28](#_Toc105355476)

[**6. 5. Suggested Mitigations Measures** 33](#_Toc105355477)

[7. Security Management Plan 34](#_Toc105355478)

[Table 6. . Summary of SMP 40](#_Toc105355479)

[8. Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) 42](#_Toc105355480)

[Annex 1. Grievance Redressing Mechanism (GRM) 44](#_Toc105355481)

## Acronyms

DL Desert Locust

DLIS Desert Locust Information Service

EHS Environment and Health Safety

ELERP Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project

ESCP Environment and Social Commitment Plan

ESF Environmental and Social Framework

ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework

ESS Environmental and Social Standard

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

GBV Gender Based Violence

GoE Government of Ethiopia

GRM Grievance Redress Mechanism

IPMP Integrated Pest Management Plan

LMP Labor Management Plan

MoA Ministry of Agriculture

MoF Ministry of Finance

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

PIU Project Implementation Unit

PPD Plant Protection Directorate

PPE Personal Protective Equipment

PSNP Productive safety Net Program

RBoA Regional Bureau of Agriculture

SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan

SMP Security Management Plan

SNNPR South Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region

SRA Security Risk Assessment

WB World Bank

# Executive Summary

Desert Locust (*Schistocerca gregaria* Forskal 1775) is the most destructive migrant pest. It has a vast invasion area of 29 million km2 affecting 60 countries and this is more than 20% of the world total land area (Steedman, 1990). The author described that Desert Locusts can exist as scattered individuals within the recession area as a solitary or, when weather condition favors become numerous, as gregarious swarms throughout the invasion area.

Desert Locust, posea major threat to agriculture within a very large area extending from the Atlantic Ocean and North Africa to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This serious migrant insect pest lives in desert and semi-desert areas. It is a much-dreaded insect due to the important damage it can inflict on agricultural crops and pasture production as well as forest cover during invasion periods and resulting socio-economic and environmental destructions. One of its main characteristics is that it has a highly developed migratory capacity over long distances, making the problem one of international scope.

From time to time, outbreaks, upsurges and plague invasions develop throughout the world in Desert Locust prone areas linked to periods of favourable rainfall.

Similarly, Ethiopia is one of the frontline countries of Desert Locust invasion and recession with areas suitable for locust breeding and gregarization in eastern Africa. The lowland areas of Eastern, South Eastern, Northern, North Eastern, Southern and South western zones of Ethiopia occupy key areas of locust development. The GoE in collaboration with relevant development partners and mobilizing the local community and resources has made relentless efforts to control the pest and prevent or minimizes its damages

The GoE (Ministry of Agriculture), recognizing the damage being caused by this existing and predicted desert locust invasion severity, has requested financial assistance from the World Bank for Desert Locust Emergency Response. Accordingly, the Project called Ethiopia Emergency Locust Response Project (EELRP) has been prepared in response to the prevalence of locust emergency in the different regions of the country.

The proposed project areas demonstrate considerable diversity in terms of water resources and landscape, from lowland, midland and highlands and livelihoods from agricultural, agro-pastoral and pastoral. The locust infestation spraying, and subsequent livelihoods support was made in the past 2020 upsurge areas.

In line with this the GoE (Ministry of Agriculture) prepared the environmental and social management instruments and general frameworks, aiming sustainable development, as per the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework requirements. The instruments that have been required and prepared for implementation of the ELERP are PIM, ESMF, IPMP, GBV, LMP, SEP, ESCP. Also, additional tools are required for the additional financing are ESMP, SMP and SA. The tools are prepared to addresses all environmental and social impacts/risks emanated from the project activities.

Due to heavy desert locust invasion in 2020 in the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, the damage incurred was very serious and also the invasion covered around 294 project districts. For this reason, to reach to the wider project community in surveillance, monitoring and early warning, livelihood restoration and to strengthen early warning and response preparedness the GoE (MoA) requested additional financing. The WB evaluated the additional financing (AF) concept note and after final agreement update required for Environmental and Social safeguard tools and one of the tools requested for additional financing activity is security management plan (SMP).

## Objective of the SMP:

To provide and maintain a safe physical environment and manage staff activities to reduce the risk of personal injury and property loss during the implementation of the Emergency Locust Response Project. This Security Management Plan covers all Component 1, 2, 3and 4 of the Project.

## Components and sub-components of the project

The project is composed of four components and each component has also subcomponents.

**Component 1:** Surveillance and Control Measures. The project adopted a multi-pronged approach for DL monitoring and control:

**Sub-component 1.1**: Continuous Surveillance is designed to inform effective control of DL and identification of affected and at-risk areas and communities

**Sub-component 1.2**: Control Measures ensure rapid response to any emerging swarms

**Sub-component 1.3**: Risk Reduction and Management

**Component 2:** Livelihood Protection and Rehabilitation

**Sub-component 2.1:** Livelihood Support: Primary purpose. delivering farmer packages to select farmers and agro-pastoralists for getting food and fodder production re-started after the DL devastation; and (ii) providing forage to affected pastorals to protect their livestock from further losses.

**Sub-component 2.2:** Pasture Rehabilitation: This sub-component focuses on protection of livelihoods in pastoralist communities through restoration of DL affected grazing lands

**Component 3:** Coordination and Early Warning Preparedness

**Sub-component 3.1**: Strengthening Early Warning Systems: The project is providing support to MoA for strengthening an integrated system for locust detection, occurrence projection, early warning and systematic data analysis and comprehension.

**Sub-component 3.2**: Improving Institutional Coordination and Community Engagement through improved communication systems.

**Component 4:** Project Management to oversee a timely implementation of the project for the achievement of the PDO in compliance with the WB procurement, financial management, environmental and social standard, and M&E requirements. The interventions include technical back-stopping and ensuring effective project monitoring and evaluation.

**Project Implementation Regions**

The project implementation frontline regions by now are Afar, Somali, Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, Tigray, Dire Dawa administration. However as migratory routes and infestation areas of Harari, Gambella, Sidama, South west Ethiopia and Benishangul gumuz Regions will be covered as deemed necessary. The project is planned to be implemented in Desert Locust breeding and invasion districts in all regions in Ethiopia.

Specific project features are desert locust surveillance, survey, monitoring, data collection and analysis to detect presence and absence of the target pest. When the presence of desert locust detected as a result of field survey, ground and aerial control operation carried out by using man power, vehicles and aircrafts. During desert locust control physical or mechanical and spray of recommended chemicals applied by using regional airports and when possible local airstrips such as Konso, Teletel, Meki, Shewarobit are used.

After control operation completed impact assessment conducted to evaluate crop and pasture yield loss or damage caused by desert locust attack and also impact on environment and health safety due to chemical application.

Livelihood rehabilitation support as a compensation of the identified and affected households provided under component two of the project.

One of the project goals is strengthening early warning and response for preparedness and capacity building.This includes establishment of desert Locust management regional bases in Dire Dawa, Komblcha and Arbaminich to strengthen early detection of the target pest occurrence and response.

## National Polices and Legal Frameworks

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has formulated several development policies, proclamations and strategies to improve the livelihood and to promote sustainable development of Ethiopian people in general and the pastoral, agro-pastoral as well as the farming communities in particular. The policies, strategies and legal frameworks that are reviewed and discussed in the following sections are directly or indirectly applicable during the implementation of ELERP AF I.

The Constitution of the FDRE is the highest policy and legal document that lays the basis for all laws and policies in the country. The Constitution of FDRE provides a number of basic and comprehensive principles that consider social protection and management in the country including the sustainable development. It recognizes the existence of diverse socio-cultural groups, including historically disadvantaged and underserved communities, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and minorities as well as their rights to socioeconomic equity and justice. The relevant articles to security risks and impacts provisions among others are identified below:

**Article 14: Rights to life, the Security of Person and Liberty**

• This article states that every person has the inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of person and liberty.

**Article 15: Right to Life**

• Every person has the right to life. No person may be deprived of his life except as a punishment for a serious criminal offence determined by law.

**Article 16: The Right of the Security of Person**

• Everyone has the right to protection against bodily harm.

## Ethiopian Relevant Laws and Regulations

The environmental and social impacts of development should be assessed in order to ensure that projects, as much as possible, must be environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable. In one way or another, this ultimately contributes to ensure sustainable development. In this regard, policies, legislative frameworks, guidelines and standards have been developed by the government of Ethiopia so as to contribute for the enhancement of sustainable development. The relevant policy, legal and administrative frameworks of the government of Ethiopian and the policies of the World Bank have been reviewed in the following sections.

**Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy (2002),**

Ethiopia has developed the national security policy to ensure its national existence or survival. Ensuring national security means protecting the population from strife, war, and disintegration. In developing such security safeguards, the country has been solving security threats which could collapse it if they were created. In addition to the internal security, sustainable peace and security of neighboring countries have a positive impact on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa

## The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework Requirement

Three Environment and Social Standards (ESS) among the 10 ESS comprising the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) are relevant for this Security Risks Assessment. ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, ESS2 labor and working conditions and ESS4 community health and safety. Those environmental and social standards indicate the need for security protection of the work environment including the requirement to manage risks emanating from engagement of security personnel in the project. The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is a living document to facilitate project planning, preparation, and implementation. It is anticipated that the SRA will be updated as additional information becomes available during project implementation, including in relation to security of personnel/project workers, timing of project activities, and associated due diligence and social risk management.

The relevant stakeholders involved in security management are: -

1. MoA (Ministry of Agriculture)
2. ELERP (Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project)
3. PPD (Plant Protection Directorate)
4. Women affairs Directorate of the MoA
5. Ministry of Lobour and Women affairs
6. Ministry of Defense
7. Regional Bureaus of Agriculture
8. Federal Police Commission
9. Federal Security
10. Regional to village level (Police commissions, Police offices and Militia)
11. Regional to District level security offices
12. District Administration

## Security Context in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia security situation varies from one district to the other and from region to region due to different reasons. The degree of threat differs from nation to nation meaning from place to place. These threats can be social, economic and political such as aggression from a neighboring country, infiltration from terrorist group, or global economic trends that compromise the nation’s welfare. Threat challenges a nation’s power and disrupts the well-being. To resolve these problems, countries develop national security safeguards against such threats. National security protects not only citizens but also the economic stability of national institutions.

Ethiopia has been facing threats that are created growing tension in many regions of the country, Oromia, Tigray, Benishangul Gumuz, Afar, Amhara and SNNP regions. The northern part of the country particularly Tigray region and Tigray region border, some parts of Amhara and Afar are the most affected parts due to conflict in Tigray. The most security risk areas are Northeast Amhara region and Northern and Northwestern zones and districts of Afar region. As a result, the government has declared the law enforcement in those affected areas. Because of these threats social and economic security crises such as increased unemployment rate exposed most youth to irregular migration and human trafficking that risks their lives. Also, serious gender-based violence recorded and most conflict area community livelihood affected.

## Potential Security Risks Identification

ELERP security trends which were experienced and observed during desert locust upsurge survey and control period from 2019-2022, consultations with the community, communication with regional, zone and district Agriculture bureaus and offices, regional desert locust survey and control operation reports, and the current security condition of regions were employed as an approach to assess the potential security risks of Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project intervention areas. Accordingly, this assessment identified the main potential security risks as follows:

1. Risk from Armed groups at project sites/activity locations (known and unknown armed groups).
2. Risk due to incidence of robbery (Armed robbery in remote areas)
3. Risk due to interregional or interethnic conflict
4. Risk due to conflict over grazing land (competition for resource)
5. Risk due to conflict with neighboring districts
6. Risk of crime (theft, mugging, looting, vandalism, sabotage)
7. Risk due to the socio-economic pressure (inflation, unemployment, COVID-19)
8. Risk of GBV and SEAH
9. Risk from accidents, incidents, disaster (Fire, Chemical, Vehicle, aircraft etc)

**Security Management Plan**

1. Prevention (with measures to avert the identified risk)
2. Preparedness (measures including physical measures, procedures, resources, emergency equipment and supplies, manpower, etc required to prepare in case the risk happens)
3. Response ((how, when, by whom the response should be initiated, coordination of efforts, including emergency warning system, emergency response)
4. Recovery (how to recover after the incident, evaluation, reporting)
5. Training plan
6. The project security management structure
7. Grievance redress mechanism

**Suggested security risks Mitigation Measures**

Potentially security risks and impacts identified in ELERP regions can be minimized and mitigated in various ways. The ESFW proposes potential mitigations measures and instruments should be applied for all anticipated risks and impacts. The following are the potential measures to specifically address the security risks and impacts:

1. **Awareness creation and training for project staff, implementing Ministry of Agriculture directorate and government security forces.**

* Continuous awareness creation and trainings on security risks and gender issues and GBV/SEA/SH will be provided for all project staff, implanting Ministry of Agriculture plant protection directorate and public security forces at all level.
* To ensure the security of project and the Ministry of Agriculture workers and property the communities receiving service from the project and the district administration are well informed about security risks and impacts, how to report incident.

1. **Information and Communication**: Federal, regional, district and local public security will be responsible to gather, organize, control and disseminate security information for project implementing sectors and the responsible Directorate staffs at different level. Government security officers at district level will have close relation with the project staffs and implementing sector experts, contactors and other supporting workers to categorize, handle, and control sensitive information. Then, district security officials again communicate with higher hierarchy security officials.
2. **Strengthen communication between relevant stakeholders at all level:** district administration office and security officials, the village community joint committee at local level has a good experience in minimizing the security risks.
3. **Secure the construction sites**: the construction site security should incorporate a variety of physical measures, i.e., fences, barriers, gates, secure storage facilities. The contractor and the community will arrange these.

## 1. Introduction

## 1.1. General Background of the Project

Desert Locust (*Schistocerca gregaria* Forskal 1775) is the most destructive migrant pest. It has a vast invasion area of 29 million km2 affecting 60 countries and this is more than 20% of the world total land area (Steedman, 1990). The author described that Desert Locusts can exist as scattered individuals within the recession area as a solitary or, when weather condition favors become numerous, as gregarious swarms throughout the invasion area.

Desert Locust, posea major threat to agriculture within a very large area extending from the Atlantic Ocean and North Africa to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. This serious migrant insect pest lives in desert and semi-desert areas. It is a much-dreaded insect due to the important damage it can inflict on agricultural crops and pasture production as well as forest cover during invasion periods and resulting socio-economic and environmental destructions. One of its main characteristics is that it has a highly developed migratory capacity over long distances, making the problem one of international scope.

From time to time, outbreaks, upsurges and plague invasions develop throughout the world in Desert Locust prone areas linked to periods of favourable rainfall. They are interrupted by recession periods during which the solitary populations of the Desert Locust are only present in very small numbers and distributed over a restricted area referred to as the recession area, mainly desert and far from cultivated lands. A total area estimated being covered by Desert Locus recession is about 16 million km² which is particularly solitary habitat zones in Arabian Peninsula, west and east Africa and Indo Pakistan areas. On the contrary, during invasions, the gregarious populations can occupy a much larger area including 65 countries in Africa, the Middle-East and Southwest Asia, covering a territory of 29 million km², extensively cultivated and populated by more than one billion people.

Similarly, Ethiopia is one of the frontline countries of Desert Locust invasion and recession with areas suitable for locust breeding and gregarization in eastern Africa. The lowland areas of Eastern, South Eastern, Northern, North Eastern, Southern and South western zones of Ethiopia occupy key areas of locust development. The GoE in collaboration with relevant development partners and mobilizing the local community and resources has made relentless efforts to control the pest and prevent or minimizes its damages. Intensive surveillance, monitoring and ground and aerial control operations were carried out in different parts of the country. However currently after March 2021 due to continued dry period in winter breeding areas of south eastern Somali region and south Ethiopia (southern Oromia and South Omo SNNPR) the upsurge declined. However, the remaining 5-6 swarms are moving in Southern Ethiopia the minor season rainfall receiving sites. The global forecast shows that there will be breeding of desert locust in summer breeding July-September in north east Ethiopia and it will continue to eastern regions.

The GoE (Ministry of Agriculture), recognizing the damage being caused by this existing and predicted desert locust invasion severity, has requested financial assistance from the World Bank for Desert Locust Emergency Response. Accordingly, the Project called Ethiopia Emergency Locust Response Project (EELRP) has been prepared in response to the prevalence of locust emergency in the different regions of the country.

The proposed project areas demonstrate considerable diversity in terms of water resources and landscape, from lowland, midland and highlands and livelihoods from agricultural, agro-pastoral and pastoral. The locust infestation spraying, and subsequent livelihoods support was made in the past 2020 upsurge areas.

In line with this the GoE (Ministry of Agriculture) prepared the environmental and social management instruments and general frameworks, aiming sustainable development, as per the World Bank Environmental and Social Frame requirements. The instruments that have been required and prepared for implementation of the ELERP are ESMF, IPMP, GBV, LMP, SEP, ESCP. The tools are prepared to addresses all environmental and social impacts/risks emanated from the project activities.

Due to heavy desert locust invasion in 2020 in the Horn of Africa including Ethiopia, the damage incurred was very serious and also the invasion covered around 294 project districts. For this reason, to reach to the wider project community in surveillance, monitoring and early warning, livelihood restoration and to strengthen early warning and response preparedness the GoE (MoA) requested additional financing. The WB evaluated the additional financing (AF) concept note and after final agreement update required for Environmental and Social safeguard tools and one of the tools requested for additional financing activity is security management plan (SMP).

## 1.2. Objective of the SMP:

To provide and maintain a safe physical environment and manage staff activities to reduce the risk of personal injury and property loss during the implementation of the Emergency Locust Response Project. This Security Management Plan covers all Component 1, 2, 3and 4 of the Project.

**1.2.1. Specific objectives**

* to identify potential security risks and impacts to project workers and other stakeholders due to the proposed ELERP interventions;
* to assess the potential risks to project property at project target areas;
* to outline procedures and steps to be taken to address requirements of the World Bank on environmental and social standards triggered by the projects;
* to propose mitigation measures for the identified security risks and impacts as a result of project implementation

## 2. Components and sub components of the project

The project has four components aligning to the ELRP MPA design apart from livelihood protection through safety nets support from the Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP, P146883). A full description of the components is available in the project appraisal document for the ELRP (P173702, Report No: PAD3904). Below is a brief description of each component and the achievements therein:

**Component 1:** Surveillance and Control Measures. The project adopted a multi-pronged approach for DL monitoring and control: (i) improving surveillance and assessment of locusts’ situation, and geographic exposure along with targeted aerial and ground spraying; (ii) institutional strengthening of select institutions and communities prone to climate change-induced locust breeding and infestation; and (iii) examining the effects of climate change on pest establishment, phenology, behavior etc. in specific agricultural settings. It is divided into the following three sub-components:

**Sub-component 1.1**: Continuous Surveillance is designed to inform effective control of DL and identification of affected and at-risk areas and communities. This sub-component funds procurement and deployment of equipment, operational costs, and training of expert teams, for surveillance of bands and swarms in need of control. The surveillance data, provide timely information to assess the risk of locust outbreaks. Developing these information sources would help develop and operationalize a preventative management strategy including community-based monitoring that integrates climate change considerations with community observations.

**Sub-component 1.2**: Control Measures ensure rapid response to any emerging swarms at three levels: backpack spraying, vehicle mounted spraying, and aerial spraying. The sub-component supports leasing of aviation services for aerial swarm control and equipping ground control teams (both backpack and vehicle mounted) to reduce locust populations and prevent their spread to new areas.

**Sub-component 1.3**: Risk Reduction and Management focus on Environmental Health and Safety (EHS), by monitoring and assessing the DL control related environmental and human health risks and ensure that adequate EHS measures are in place to eliminate/minimize any risks.

**Component 2:** Livelihood Protection and Rehabilitation finances assets and technical assistance/training for affected farming and pastoralist households to prevent food insecurity and the need for negative coping by households that would slow their recovery (for example, the sale of productive assets to buy food). It includes the following sub-components:

**Sub-component 2.1:** Livelihood Support: Primary purpose is: (i) delivering farmer packages to select farmers and agro-pastoralists for getting food and fodder production re-started after the DL devastation; and (ii) providing forage to affected pastorals to protect their livestock from further losses. The project uses the PSNP beneficiary targeting guidelines to identify affected farmer households, in partnership with the relevant regional and district level authorities.

**Sub-component 2.2:** Pasture Rehabilitation: This sub-component focuses on protection of livelihoods in pastoralist communities through restoration of DL affected grazing lands. Primary focus is on strengthening livestock production by providing fodder seeds to pastoralists for restoration of pastures. Furthermore, rehabilitation of communal pasture is conducted through community mobilization to oversee the pasture seed distribution as well as seedlings and saplings wherever possible in line with the ecological variation.

**Component 3:** Coordination and Early Warning Preparedness. The objective is institutional strengthening of MoA’s Plant Protection Directorate through capacity building and technical assistance. The two sub-components are described below.

**Sub-component 3.1**: Strengthening Early Warning Systems: The project is providing support to MoA for strengthening an integrated system for locust detection, occurrence projection, early warning and systematic data analysis and comprehension. Priority is accorded to: (i) operationalizing early warning system to support prevention and rapid response to climate change induced locust infestation; and (ii) building capacity for rapid and targeted short-term responses and long-term adaptation planning. This will help improve the geospatial targeting and precision of locust spraying interventions under component.

**Sub-component 3.2**: Improving Institutional Coordination and Community Engagement through improved communication systems. The purpose is for ensuring adequate government capacity to monitor the relationships between weather trends and desert locust territories and identify the conditions for an outbreak and early population increases.

The project has completed an assessment of the national DL surveillance and response system; adopted survey/data information collection tools identified by FAO/Desert Locust Information System (DLIS); trained experts from the Plant Protection Directorate and regional bureaus offices; and acquired a site in Arbaminch for regional base for DL monitoring and control.

To strengthen the monitoring, early warning and preparedness three strategic regional bases established in areas closer to desert locust breeding and entrance from neighbour countries. The regional bases are proposed and established in Kombolcha to serve the northeaster, Dire Dawa to serve the eastern and Arbaminch to provide service to the southern breeding areas of the country.

In addition, the regional bases construction fulfils the following: -

The Initial need study document for the base establishment to strengthen early warning system in areas closer to the breeding sites conducted by the coordination of ELERP staff in collaboration with the plant protection Directorate of the Ministry of Agriculture and submitted to the Ministry of Agriculture management. The Management of the Ministry approved the document and in turn the ELERP PIU submitted the document to the World Bank during the second mission of evaluation. The world bank appreciated the idea of base establishment in areas closer to desert locust to strengthen early warning and preparedness. Then after the need for three strategic bases establishment and construction included in the plan of 2014 EFY and additional financing concept note.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Agriculture top management with official letter requested the regional bureaus and city administrations land for construction of target bases. In this case, Amhara region bureau of Agriculture, Kombolcha city administration, Dir Dawa city Agriculture Bureau and city administration and South Nations, Nationalities and people’s region bureau of Agriculture and Arbaminch city administration.

i) Land securing for base construction will be processed by the Ministry of Agriculture

ii) The respective regional Bureaus and city administration will provide official certificate of secured land

iii) The design of building shall include safe waste management procedure to minimize contamination

iv) The Community consultation will be conducted by independent consultant and minute will be produced and report submitted to the WB and relevant offices of the Ministry of Agriculture

v) Assessment of site or land secured will be conducted by independent consultant

vi) Clearance will be issued by the local environment authority office

vii) The Ministry of Agriculture procurement directorate with ELRP procurement specialist prepare bid contract document by consulting world bank senior procurement specialist

After approval or no objection process from World Bank senior procurement specialist bid will be processed according to world bank goods, work and other procurement guidelines.

**Component 4:** Project Management to oversee a timely implementation of the project for the achievement of the PDO in compliance with the WB procurement, financial management, environmental and social standard, and M&E requirements. The interventions include technical back-stopping and ensuring effective project monitoring and evaluation.

## 2.1. Project Framework

The expected outcome under this project is to reduce the vulnerability of farmers, agro-pastoralists and pastoralist to limit desert control infestations by supporting control strategies for prevention, monitoring early warning, reaction and mitigation at the national level and strengthening the early warning and response preparedness system. The following are major key intended result areas of this project.

 Emergency locust-control measures are improved (cost effective, timely and efficient), and undertaken in environmental and social safe and sustainable manner;

 Locust Control operations implemented according to plan and FAO guidelines and World Bank environmental and social safeguard standards (ESS);

 Pesticide management meets international safety regulations;

 Livelihood of people affected by locust infestation addressed;

 Percentage of beneficiaries receiving inputs from project to restore livelihood increased;

 Hectare of pastureland rehabilitated by the project increased;

 Desert locust prediction and mitigation mechanism established by end of project (Country level data storage, data analytics, data interpretation capability built).

* Security of personnel and property of the project managed according to the ESMF, SMP, ESMP, IPMP, ESCP, GBV, GRM, LMP and SEP.

## 2.2. Project Target Areas

In general, the EELRP will be working in the PSNP implementing regions specifically in locust infested areas of Afar, Eastern Amhara, South eastern and eastern Oromia, Somali, southern districts of Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP), Southern Tigray, and Dire Dawa City Administration. In total, 294 woredas are invaded by the desert locust at varying degrees of infestation scope of impact.

The project implementation frontline regions by now are Afar, Somali, Amhara, Oromia, SNNPR, Tigray, Dire Dawa administration. However as migratory routes and infestation areas of Harari, Gambella, Sidama, South west Ethiopia and Benishangul gumuz Regions will be covered as deemed necessary. The project is planned to be implemented in Desert Locust breeding and invasion districts in all regions in Ethiopia.

Specific project features are desert locust surveillance, survey, monitoring, data collection and analysis to detect presence and absence of the target pest. When the presence of desert locust detected as a result of field survey, ground and aerial control operation carried out by using human power, vehicles and aircrafts. During desert locust control physical or mechanical and spray of recommended chemicals applied by using regional airports and when possible local airstrips such as Konso, Teletel, Meki, Shewarobit are used.

After control operation completed impact assessment conducted to evaluate crop and pasture yield loss or damage caused by desert locust attack and also impact on environment and health safety due to chemical application.

Livelihood rehabilitation support as a compensation of the identified and affected households provided under component two of the project.

One of the project goals is strengthening early warning and response for preparedness and capacity building.This includes establishment of desert Locust management regional bases in Dire Dawa, Komblcha and Arbaminich to strengthen early detection of the target pest occurrence and response.

**Table 1. Desert Locust Breeding areas and Seasons**

| No | Region | Districts | Breeding seasons |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 1 | Afar | Chifra, Mile, Adaar, Ewa, Awura, Gulina, Teru, Yalo, Magale, Kuri, Bidu, Abiala, Erebiti, Afambo, Asayita, Dufti, Kuneba, Elidar, Afder, Telalak, Dawe, Dalefage, Dalol, (24) | Summer (June-Sept) |
|  | Afar | Gewane, Amibera, Dulecha, Awash, Argoba, Gelealo (6) | Summer (June-Sept) and Spring (Feb-May) |
| 2 | Somali | Ayisha, Adigala, Shinile, Erer, Denbel, Awubare, Tuluguled, Jijiga, Tuluguled, Harawe (10) | Summer (June-Sept) and Spring (Feb-May) |
|  | Somali | Harshin, Gashamo, Kebribeya, Degahabur, Degehamido, Aware, Danot, Daratole, Worder, Geladin, Bohi, Kabridehar, Kudunber, Shilabo, Eliogaden, Shekosh, Debeweyin, Gode, Kelafo, Bereano, Mustehin, Ferfer, Garbo, East Emi, West Emi, Segeg, Fiki, Legahida, Meyumulik, Adadile. Mieso, Afdem, Afder, Elkere, Cheret, Guradhamole, GoroBekakisa, Bare, Dolobay, Doloodo, Moyale, Elele, Garbo (43) | Winter breeding (Oct-Jan) |
| 3 | Oromia | Chineksan, Babile, Gursum, Jarso, Kombolcha, Fedis, Karsa, Meta, Midagatola, Mayumuluk, Gorogutu, Doba, Mieso, Daweserer, Rayitu, Legahida, Sawena, Liben, Gumieldelo, Gorodola, Wachile, Dubluk, Yabelo, Teltele, (24) | Winter breeding  (Oct-Jan) |
|  |  | Moyale, Meta, Meoso, Goro gutu, Doba, Kersa (7) | Spring (Feb-May) |
| 4 | Amhara | Worababu, Bati, Habru, Kobo, Daweharawa, kalu, Kobo twon, Guba lafto, Jile (9) | Summer (June-Sept) |
| 5 | Tigray | TseadeAmba, Azebo, Alamata, Ganta, Meoni (5) | Summer (June-Sept) |
| 6 | SNNPR | Bena tsemay, Male, Hamer, Dasenech, Egnangatom, Konso, Kena, Segen zuria, Amaro, Ale, Derashe, Burji, Marta, Kamba, uba, Humbo, AbalaAbaya, Mirab Abaya, Basketo, Duguna fango, Siraro badawacho, (21) | Spring (Feb-May) |
| 7 | Dire Dawa | Dire Dawa (4 ) | Summer (June-Sept) & spring (Feb-May) |

**2.2.1. Pesticide Stores and locations**

Chemical stores are found in various part of the country. At centre (national Store) a store with capacity handling more than 400,000lt; in East Dire Dawa with the capacity handling 100,000 lt; In Samara 100,000lt capacity; 100,000 lt in Jigjiga; 50,000 lt capacity in Hawassa; 100,000 lt capacity in Bishoftu; 100,000 lt in Kombolcha; 100,000 lt in Bahir Dar; and Mekele 100,000 lt capacity are found and there are also medium storage in all zones in the country. However as one of the key informants indicated about the stores situations, some of these pesticide stores are not good enough. Hence renovation of these stores has been required.

## 3. Methodology

To undertake preparation of this security management plan world Bank funding projects security management plan and related documents reviewed, environmental and social safeguard specialists consulted. Security risks information of each region collected by office discussion with Desert Locust officers of the Ministry of Agriculture plant Protection Directorate and regional bureaus desert locust focal experts. Besides communication with experts’ manuals, reports, international and National policies, laws, regulations and WB ESF referred.

## 4. Legal and Institutional Framework

The following relevant national and international regulations, laws and WB ESF regulations related to the security risk assessment were reviewed.

## 4.1. National Polices and Legal Frameworks

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) has formulated several development policies, proclamations and strategies to improve the livelihood and to promote sustainable development of Ethiopian people in general and the pastoral, agro-pastoral as well as the farming communities in particular. The policies, strategies and legal frameworks that are reviewed and discussed in the following sections are directly or indirectly applicable during the implementation of ELERP AF I.

# 4.1.1. The Constitution of Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE)

The Constitution of the FDRE is the highest policy and legal document that lays the basis for all laws and policies in the country. The Constitution of FDRE provides a number of basic and comprehensive principles that consider social protection and management in the country including the sustainable development. It recognizes the existence of diverse socio-cultural groups, including historically disadvantaged and underserved communities, pastoralists, agro-pastoralists and minorities as well as their rights to socioeconomic equity and justice. The relevant articles to security risks and impacts provisions among others are identified below:

**Article 14: Rights to life, the Security of Person and Liberty**

• This article states that every person has the inviolable and inalienable right to life, the security of person and liberty.

**Article 15: Right to Life**

• Every person has the right to life. No person may be deprived of his life except as a punishment for a serious criminal offence determined by law.

**Article 16: The Right of the Security of Person**

• Everyone has the right to protection against bodily harm.

**Article 17: Right to Liberty**

• No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law.

• No person may be subjected to arbitrary arrest, and no person may be detained without a charge or conviction against him.

**Article 18: Prohibition against Inhuman Treatment**

• Sub article 1 in this article states that everyone has the right to protection against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

**Article 25: Right to Equality**

• All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection without discrimination on grounds of race, nation, nationality, or other social origin, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status.

**Article 26: Right to Privacy**

• Article 26(1) state that everyone has the right to privacy. This right shall include the right not to be subjected to searches of his home, person or property, or the seizure of any property under/his personal possession.

**Article 28: Crimes against Humanity**

• Article 28(1) states that criminal liability of persons who commit crimes against humanity, so defined by international agreements ratified by Ethiopia and by other laws of Ethiopia, such as genocide, summary executions, forcible disappearances or torture shall not be barred by statute of limitation. Such offences may not be commuted by amnesty or pardon of the legislature or any other state organ**.**

**Article 32: Freedom of Movement**

• Article 32(1) states that any Ethiopian or foreign national lawfully in Ethiopia has, within the national territory, the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence, as well as the freedom to leave the country at any time he wishes to.

**Article 37: Rights of Access to Justice**

• Everyone has the right to bring a justifiable matter to, and to obtain a decision or judgment by, a court of law or any other competent body with judicial power.

**Article 42: Rights of Labor** Article 42(2) stipulates that ‘workers have the right to a healthy and safe work environment’, obliging an employer (be it government or private) to take all necessary measures to ensure that workplace is safe, healthy and free of any danger to the wellbeing of workers.

**Article 87: Principles for National Defense**

• Article 87(3) it states that the armed forces shall protect the sovereignty of the country and carry out any responsibilities as may be assigned to them under any state of emergency declared in accordance with the Constitution.

**Article 90: Social Objectives**

• Article 90(1) states that to the extent the country’s resources permit, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security.

## 4.2. Ethiopian Relevant Laws and Regulations

The environmental and social impacts of development should be assessed in order to ensure that projects, as much as possible, must be environmentally sustainable and socially acceptable. In one way or another, this ultimately contributes to ensure sustainable development. In this regard, policies, legislative frameworks, guidelines and standards have been developed by the government of Ethiopia so as to contribute for the enhancement of sustainable development. The relevant policy, legal and administrative frameworks of the government of Ethiopian and the policies of the World Bank have been reviewed in the following sections.

**4.2.1. National Social Protection Strategy of Ethiopia**

Ethiopia has formulated National Social Protection policy in 2012 with a general objective to create an enabling environment in which citizens (including people with special need and other vulnerable groups have the right to equitable access to all social protection services that will enhance their growth and development. Ethiopia’s social protection policy is a central public policy component for addressing poverty, vulnerability and inequality.

# 4.2.2. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy (2002)

Ethiopia has developed the national security policy to ensure its national existence or survival. Ensuring national security means protecting the population from strife, war, and disintegration. In developing such security safeguards, the country has been solving security threats which could collapse it if they were created. In addition to the internal security, sustainable peace and security of neighboring countries have a positive impact on Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Having this fact in mind, Ethiopian has experience in solving regional security risks through its security organizations. The security organizations which have the mandate to guarantee the maintenance of law and order to the public and to protect constitutional violence and disorders in Ethiopia are the Ethiopian National Defense Force, the Ethiopian Federal Police Force to maintain law and order at the federal level (including riot control and to investigate organized crime), Regional Police, Regional Special Police Forces, which maintains law and order in Ethiopia’s constituent states. Mainly, the Ethiopian National Intelligence and Security Service are tasked with gathering information necessary to protect national security.

## 4.3. The World Bank Environmental and Social Framework Requirement

Three Environment and Social Standards (ESS) among the 10 ESS comprising the World Bank Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) are relevant for this Security Risks Assessment. ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts, ESS2 labor and working conditions and ESS4 community health and safety. Those environmental and social standards indicate the need for security protection of the work environment including the requirement to manage risks emanating from engagement of security personnel in the project. The Security Risk Assessment (SRA) is a living document to facilitate project planning, preparation, and implementation. It is anticipated that the SRA will be updated as additional information becomes available during project implementation, including in relation to security of personnel/project workers, timing of project activities, and associated due diligence and social risk management.

ESS1: Assessment and Management of Environmental and Social Risks and Impacts

According to the World Banks ESF, Social risks and impacts, including: (i) threats to human security through the escalation of personal, communal or interstate conflict, crime or violence; (ii) risks that project impacts fall disproportionately on individuals or groups who, because of their particular circumstances, may be disadvantaged or vulnerable; (iii) any prejudice or discrimination toward individuals or groups in providing access to development resources and project benefits, particularly in the case of those who may be disadvantaged or vulnerable; (iv) negative economic and social impacts relating to the involuntary taking of land or restrictions on land use; (v) risks or impacts associated with land and natural resource tenure and use, including (as relevant) potential project impacts on local land use patterns and tenure arrangements, land access and availability, food security and land values, and any corresponding risks related to conflict or contestation over land and natural resources; (vi) impacts on the health, safety and well-being of workers and project-affected communities; and (vii) risks to cultural heritage.

The main objective of this Standard is to identify, evaluate and manage the environment and social risks and impacts of the project in a manner consistent with the ESSs. As the result adopt mitigation hierarchy approach to:

• Anticipate and avoid risks and impacts;

• Where avoidance is not possible, minimize or reduce risks and impacts to acceptable levels;

• Once risks and impacts have been minimized or reduced, mitigate; and

• Where significant residual impacts remain, compensate for or offset them, where technically and financially feasible.

ESS2: Labor and Working Conditions

The SRA needs to meet the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework (ESF), requirements, specifically ESS2. This SRA sets out the terms and conditions of employment for employing or otherwise engaging workers on the project, specifies the requirements, standards to be met, policies, and procedures to be followed, assesses risks, and proposes implementation of compliance measures. The SRA is developed to help avoid, mitigate, and manage security risks and impacts in relation to project workers and ensure non-discrimination, equal opportunity, protection, fair treatment, and safe and healthy working conditions.

The main objectives of WB ESS 2 are the following:

• To promote safety and health at work place.

• To promote the fair treatment, non-discrimination, and equal opportunity of project workers.

• To protect project workers, including vulnerable workers such as women, persons with disabilities, children (of working age, in accordance with this ESS) and migrant workers, contracted workers, community workers, and primary supply workers, as appropriate.

• To prevent the use of all forms of forced labor and child labor.

• To support the principles of freedom of association and collective bargaining of project workers in a manner consistent with national law.

• To provide project workers with accessible means to raise workplace concerns.

The term “project worker” refers to:

(a) People employed or engaged directly by the Borrower (including the project proponent and the project implementing agencies) to work specifically in relation to the project (direct workers);

(b) people employed or engaged through third parties to perform work related to core functions of the project, regardless of location (contracted workers);

(c) People employed or engaged by the Borrower’s primary suppliers (primary supply workers);

(d) People employed or engaged in providing community labor (community workers).

WB ESS2 applies to project workers including fulltime, part-time, temporary, seasonal and migrant workers.

The government of Ethiopia has enacted Labor Proclamation No 1156/2019 with the general objectives and requirements to ensure worker-employer relations are governed by basic principles of rights and obligations with a view to enabling workers and employers to secure durable industrial peace; sustainable productivity and competitiveness through cooperative engagement towards the all-round development of the country. The proclamation under article 92 stated that an employer shall take the necessary measure to safeguard adequately the health and safety of workers. This article under sub articles 1 and 6 indicated that the employer has an obligation to comply with the occupational health and safety requirements provided for in the Proclamation to ensure that the work place and premises of the undertaking do not pose threats to the health and safety of workers.

ESS4: Community Health and Safety

ESS4 recognize that project activities, equipment and infrastructure can increase community exposure to risks and impacts. In addition, communities that are already subjected to impacts from climate change may also experience an acceleration or intensification of impacts due to project activities. ESS4 addresses the health, safety, and security risks and impacts on project-affected communities and the corresponding responsibility of Borrowers to avoid or minimize such risks and impacts, with particular attention to people who, because of their particular circumstances, may be vulnerable.

The main objectives of WB ESS 4 are the following:

• To anticipate and avoid adverse impacts on the health and safety of project-affected communities during the project life cycle from both routine and no routine circumstances.

• To promote quality and safety, and considerations relating to climate change, in the design and construction of infrastructure, including dams.

• To avoid or minimize community exposure to project-related traffic and road safety risks, diseases and hazardous materials.

• To have in place effective measures to address emergency events.

• To ensure that the safeguarding of personnel and property is carried out in a manner that avoids or minimizes risks to the project-affected communities.

Briefly, ESS 4 requires project to do the following:

• Assess the security risk their operations may have or could create for communities;

• Develop ways to manage and mitigate these risks;

• Engage with public security; and

• Review and report on allegations of unlawful acts by public security personnel.

# 4.4. Standards and good international practices

This security management plan is anchored on World Bank Environmental and Social Standard 4 (ESS4) that covers Community Health and Safety on sub section (b) Personnel Security in line with the World Bank Good Practice Note on Assessing and Managing Risks and Impacts of the Use of Security and the Guidelines for Implementation of the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by law Enforcement Officials.

The standard role of the public security will be to maintain the rule of law, including safeguarding human rights and deterring act that threaten the project personnel and facilities. The public security forces to be deployed shall be competent, appropriate and proportional to the threat.

# 4.5. Relevant institutions involved in security management

The relevant stakeholders involved in security management are: -

1. MoA (Ministry of Agriculture)
2. ELERP (Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project)
3. PPD (Plant Protection Directorate)
4. Women affairs Directorate of the MoA
5. Ministry of Labour and Women affairs
6. Ministry of Defense
7. Regional Bureaus of Agriculture
8. Federal Police Commission
9. Federal Security
10. Regional to village level (Police commissions, Police offices and Militia)
11. Regional to District level security offices
12. District Administration

## 5. Security Risk Assessment

## 5.1. Security Context in Ethiopia

In Ethiopia security situation varies from one district to the other and from region to region due to different reasons. The degree of threat differs from nation to nation meaning from place to place. These threats can be social, economic and political such as aggression from a neighboring country, infiltration from terrorist group, or global economic trends that compromise the nation’s welfare. Threat challenges a nation’s power and disrupts the well-being. To resolve these problems, countries develop national security safeguards against such threats. National security protects not only citizens but also the economic stability of national institutions.

Ethiopia has been facing threats that are created growing tension in many regions of the country, Oromia, Tigray, Benishangul Gumuz, Afar, Amhara and SNNP regions. The northern part of the country particularly Tigray region and Tigray region border, some parts of Amhara and Afar are the most affected parts due to conflict in Tigray. The most security risk areas are Northeast Amhara region and Northern and Northwestern zones and districts of Afar region. As a result, the government has declared the law enforcement in those affected areas. Because of these threats social and economic security crises such as increased unemployment rate exposed most youth to irregular migration and human trafficking that risks their lives. Also, serious gender-based violence recorded and most conflict area community livelihood affected.

The pandemic of COVID-19 is also among the threats to Ethiopia. World Bank March 2021 report showed that, like the rest of the world, Ethiopia has been experiencing the unprecedented social and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The COVID-19 shock is expected to be transitory with potential recovery possible in 2021/22, but the overall adverse economic impact on Ethiopia will be substantial. The economic impact of COVID-19 includes the increased price of basic foods, rising unemployment, slowdown in growth, and increase in poverty. And also, the pandemic had caused a major drop in income of the population. The above said calamities resulted by COVID-19 will lead the community specially the youth to robbery, theft, kidnap and other social disorders which are considered grand security challenges.

These all are major cause for economic crisis which in turn translates into social crises such as a climbing unemployment rate that exposes most youth to irregular migration and human trafficking that risks their lives. Moreover, internal displacements, raising rural-urban mobility, and increasing risks of organized robbery and theft are manifestations of socio-economic crises. The Ethiopian government has responded to these threats by undertaking multiple initiatives.

## 5.2. Project Areas Security Risk

The ELERP project regions are Tigray, Amhara, Afar, Somali, Oromia, SNNP and Dire Dawa city administration.

The government of Ethiopia is currently undertaking law enforcement operation in the northern part of the country. The military operation was started in Tigray region in November 2020, and gradually expanded to the neighboring Afar and Amhara regions. Even though, Desert Locust survey and control operation was not affected since the conflict started during winter breeding season and desert locust swarms shifted to south eastern part of the country particularly Somali and eastern Oromia regions. That means South Tigray, North East Amhara and Afar regions are summer breeding areas and it takes place from June to September. Desert Locust Survey and control operation in the aforementioned regions prone to the current conflict was carried out in summer breeding season.

However, security situation in north east Amhara and Afar regions improving The situation in Tigray is high risk because of the armed group and conflict. Meanwhile, Northeast Amhara and Afar regions project districts closer to Tigray region are security risk areas due to nearby Armed groups. The security situation in Oromia particularly in desert locust invasion areas of southern Oromia where survey and control operation carried out, the security risks are low due to no frequent security problems reported and seen. However, ethnic and conflict between villages and districts on grazing land competition, risk of crime such as theft and looting. Other security risks like GBV/SEAH and crime are common in all project regions. In desert locust breeding and invasion districts border of Amhara and Afar as well as Somali and Oromia regions the common security risk is ethnic and grazing land competition conflict. In Somali region project districts risk from interregional and interethnic are expected security risks. The South Nations and Nationalities and Peoples Region (SNNPR) particularly the project districts in south Omo zone, Konso, Derashe and Amaro special districts mostly faces border and ethnic conflict.

Security Management for the project lies under the oversight and responsibility of the Project Coordinator at National and the Regional Bureau of Agriculture directly under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). MoA will work closely with the Ministry of finance, National police, security and Ministry of defense in the deployment of the security officers in case of security crises to the project sites or desert locust control bases. The command and communication structure of the National Police Service will be adopted. The police service shall perform its functions under the overall direction, supervision and control of national police commissioner in collaboration with regional police commissioners at regional and district level and Officer Commanding Station at Local Level.

## 6. Potential Security Risks Identification, evaluation, rating and mitigation measures

## 6.1. Potential Security Risks Identification

ELERP security trends which were experienced and observed during desert locust upsurge survey and control period from 2019-2022, consultations with the community, communication with regional, zone and district Agriculture bureaus and offices, regional desert locust survey and control operation reports, and the current security condition of regions were employed as an approach to assess the potential security risks of Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project intervention areas. Accordingly, this assessment identified the main potential security risks as follows:

a) Risk from Armed groups at project sites/activity locations (known and unknown armed groups).

b). Risk due to incidence of robbery (Armed robbery in remote areas)

c) Risk due to interregional or interethnic conflict

d). Risk due to conflict over grazing land (competition for resource)

e). Risk due to conflict with neighboring districts

f). Risk of crime (theft, mugging, looting, vandalism, sabotage)

g). Risk due to the socio-economic pressure (inflation, unemployment, COVID-19)

h). Risk of GBV and SEAH

i). Risk from accidents, incidents, disaster (Fire, Chemical, Vehicle, aircraft etc)

## 6.2 Security Risk Analysis and Evaluation

For the purpose of security risk analysis and evaluation, two-factor methods that are the probability of occurrence as indicated in table 1 and an estimate of the impact on the project as indicated in table 2.

**Table 1: Probability of risk occurrence**

| **Probability of Occurrences** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Likelihood (L)** | **Meaning** | **Rating** |
| **Frequent** | Occurs frequently   * Will be continuously experienced unless action is taken to change events | 5 |
| **Likely** | Occur less frequently   * Issues identified with minimal activity | 4 |
| **Occasional** | Occurs sporadically   * Potential issues discovered during focused review. | 3 |
| **Seldom** | Unlikely to occur   * Minimal issue identification during focused review | 2 |
| Improbable | * Highly unlikely to occur | 1 |

## 6.3. Security Risk rating and prioritization

Critical, high, medium, low, and negligible security risk ratings are assigned to activities based on their likelihood of risk occurrence and the severity of the risk. The severity column that best describes the risk result can be found using the risk matrix and relative risk value. Then, in the likelihood row, choose the best description for the possibility of the severity occurring. The risk level is indicated in the box at the intersection of the row and column. The relative risk value can be used to prioritize necessary activities for effectively managing the security risks associated with the proposed project. As a result, table 7 determines priority using the following ranges.

## 6.4 Risk level versus priority

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Risk value** | **Risk level** | **Action** |
| **25** | **Critical** | Ongoing operations are unsustainable and projects may be suspended for indefinite periods. Implementation of relocation or evacuation plan, as applicable/ may be other possible options checked. |
| **15-20** | **High** | It requires priority and immediate action to control the risk or to avoid /minimize the threat through appropriate mitigation measures. |
| **5-12** | **Medium** | It requires a planned approach to control the risks and apply temporary measures if required. |
| **2-4** | **Low** | It may be considered as acceptable and further reduction may not necessary. However, if the risk can be resolved quickly and efficiently, control measures should be implemented. |
| **1** | **Negligible** | No need of further action |

**Table 2: Risk Severity descriptions and rating**

| **Severity (S)** | **Potential Trigger** | **Rating** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Critical | * Unrest/conflict in neighboring regions and countries impacting on project activities * Ongoing operations are unsustainable and projects may be suspended for indefinite periods * Serious assault/fatality ofteam member; * Withdrawal of UN Support from project (or nearby), location; * Withdrawal/lack of Govt * Support to ensure security. | **5** |
| High | * Only essential operational travel should be considered for International organizations like UN and project staffs * Presence of high threats against government and non-government organizations * Community unrest/conflict is high * Projects may be suspended for indefinite periods * Armed robbery at office/ activity location may be serious and impacting project activities * Serious injury/illness of project personnel. * Armed conflict nearby impacting project activities * GBV/SEA/SH is high | **4** |
| Medium | * Sometimes staffs travel to project areas restricted; * Suspension of activities for short period of time; * Serious injury/illness of project personnel. * GBV/SEA/SH risks | **3** |
| Low | * Infrequently, there may be ethnic conflict; * Limited conflict between host and refugee communities but not affect the project; * Rarely, there may be limitation of access to target locations due to insecurity; * incident affecting project personnel | **2** |
| Negligible | * Agreement by community/ all stakeholders * Agreement between Project implementation unit (PIU) and WB TTL; | **1** |

The security risk can be calculated using the following formula risk matrix as indicated in table 3.

**Relative Risk = L\*S**  whereas, ‘’L’’ stands for likelihood of occurrence and ‘’S’’ stands for severity of impact

**Table 3: Risk Matrix**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Likelihood (L)*** | ***Severity (S)*** | | | | |
| *1* | *2* | *3* | *4* | *5* |
| *5* | *5* | *10* | *15* | *20* | *25* |
| *4* | *4* | *8* | *12* | *16* | *20* |
| *3* | *3* | *6* | *9* | *12* | *16* |
| *2* | *2* | *4* | *6* | *8* | *10* |
| *1* | *1* | *2* | *3* | *4* | *5* |

*Note:*

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | *Critical* |  | *High* |  | *Medium* |  | *Low* |  | *Negligible* |

**Table 4: Calculated security risk value for ELERP AF I**

| Security risks identified | Likelihood (L | Tigray | | | | | Amhara | | | | | Afar | | | | | Oromia | | | | | Somali | | | | | | SNNP | | | | | | Dire Dawa | | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Severity | | | | | Severity | | | | | Severity | | | | | Severity | | | | | Severity | | | | | | Severity | | | | | | Severity | | | | |
| 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 1 | | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Armed group | 5 |  |  |  |  | 25 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | 12 |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  | 8 |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Risk from robbery | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  | |  | 9 |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | | 4 |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| GBV/SEAH | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  | |  | 12 |  |  |  | |  | 9 |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Interregional and interethnic conflict | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 8 |  |  |  |  | 8 |  |  | |  | 6 |  |  |  | | 4 |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Conflict over Grazing land | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  | |  |  | 12 |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 | 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | | 4 |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Crime (Theft, Looting, mugging etc) | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  | |  |  | 6 |  |  | | 4 |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Socioeconomic pressure | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 6 |  |  |  | |  |  | 8 |  |  | | 4 |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Risk due to conflict with neighboring districts | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  |  | 9 |  |  |  | |  |  | 12 |  |  | |  | 9 |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| Risk from incidents, accident and disaster | 5 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 4 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 16 |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 3 |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 12 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  | 9 |  |  |  | |  | 9 |  |  |
| 2 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |
| 1 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |  | |  |  |  |  |

Based on table 4 above summary of relative risk level of the project, relative risk value is indicated in table 5 below for each project Region

**Table 5: Relative Risk values of the project regions**

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Security risks identified | Relative value | | | | | | |
| Tigray | Amhara | Afar | Oromia | Somali | SNNPR | Dire Dawa |
| Armed group | 25 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 12 | 12 | 8 |
| Risk due to robbery | 16 | 12 | 9 | 16 | 9 | 9 | 4 |
| GBV/SEAH | 16 | 16 | 9 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 9 |
| Risk due to interethnic | 4 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 8 | 6 | 4 |
| Grazing land conflict | 2 | 6 | 6 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 4 |
| Crime | 16 | 12 | 9 | 12 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| Socio-economic pressure | 16 | 12 | 4 | 12 | 6 | 8 | 4 |
| Conflict with neighboring districts | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 9 | 12 | 9 |
| Incidents, accidents and disaster | 12 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 16 | 9 | 9 |

Ethiopia Locust Emergency Response Project (ELERP) regions overall security situation assessed, evaluated and ranked. The security risks identified and relative value matrix result shows medium security risk project. The analysis identified 9 key security risks in project regions having 1 critical, 11 High risk, 43 medium risks, 8 low risks, and no negligible /very low risks. From these, we can conclude that the overall ELERP regions security risk is rated medium.

**6. 5. Suggested Mitigations Measures**

Potentially security risks and impacts identified in ELERP regions can be minimized and mitigated in various ways. The ESFW proposes potential mitigations measures and instruments should be applied for all anticipated risks and impacts. The following are the potential measures to specifically address the security risks and impacts:

1. **Awareness creation and training for project staff, implementing Ministry of Agriculture directorate and government security forces.**

* Continuous awareness creation and trainings on security risks and gender issues and GBV/SEA/SH will be provided for all project staff, implanting Ministry of Agriculture plant protection directorate and public security forces at all level.
* To ensure the security of project and the Ministry of Agriculture workers and property the communities receiving service from the project and the district administration are well informed about security risks and impacts, how to report incident.

1. **Information and Communication**: Federal, regional, district and local public security will be responsible to gather, organize, control and disseminate security information for project implementing sectors and the responsible Directorate staffs at different level. Government security officers at district level will have close relation with the project staffs and implementing sector experts, contactors and other supporting workers to categorize, handle, and control sensitive information. Then, district security officials again communicate with higher hierarchy security officials.
2. **Strengthen communication between relevant stakeholders at all level:** district administration office and security officials, the village community joint committee at local level has a good experience in minimizing the security risks.
3. **Secure the construction sites**: the construction site security should incorporate a variety of physical measures, i.e., fences, barriers, gates, secure storage facilities. The contractor and the community will arrange these.

# 7. Security Management Plan

The SRMP process is an approach to evaluate security risks to ensure that a harmonized  
threat and risk analysis leads to effective security decision-making and to the implementation of SRMP measures. SRM measures are identified after specific threats and risks are identified so that mitigation or prevention measures are proposed for implementation. SRM measures may include training and awareness creation, information, situation updates, physical improvements to facilities or procedural changes. SRM measures need to be linked to the preceding security risk assessment assisting to reduce either the likelihood or the impact of an event.

The Locust Emergency Response Project will use the following risk management procedures while implementing the project operation in identified security potential areas.

**i). Prevention**

In the event of a critical security incident, or a significant deterioration in the security environment, it may be necessary to take significant steps in order to safeguard the wellbeing of personnel and prevent harm or damage to project resources based on an assessment. There was an experience during parent project desert locust upsurge management operation in which at the end of summer breeding July-October 2020 project implementation was totally paused in Tigray region due to security problem occurred in the region. Most of the locust emergency response project sub-projects like chemical stores, equipment in the store, aircrafts in local airstrips during peak migratory pest control operation period will be managed by government guards deployed by implementing sectors. Fence and access gates are the main physical security management system used in these sub projects. But based on site specific security risk assessment the extent of physical security measures (fence, gate check, store lock…) will be strengthened and aligned to the identified security concerns.

Based on information communication with project regions, zones and districts, prevention system designed to keep the safety of project staff, implementation organization MoA PPD and project property. Prevention is essential to mitigate security risks and to minimize impacts.

**ii) Preparedness**

Standard telecommunication connection facilities which are within the scope of the project will be the main means of communication method to be used during the implementation of this SMP. This includes office telephone, mobile phone, fax and email communications. Virtual communication options with regional bureaus plant protection directorate and district offices of Agriculture pest management coordination team will be strengthened during restrictions of movement.

Managing regional base construction contractor site works and staff movement will be made inline and proportionate to the potential or identified security risks. This may include seeking the risk prevention support from government security personnel while working at risk potential sites and accompanying staff travels in all security potential areas**. T**he project specific sites will be the subject of site-specific risk assessments, which will guide proportionate security measures in line with ESS4. Under the overall responsibility of the project coordinator, the focal persons assigned at federal and regional levels will be the main point of contact.

Preparedness helps to deploy the staff and property to the project woredas based on security risk evaluation and prioritization.

**iii). Responses**

Safety and security incidents will be reported to the PIU immediately from region or district and will be shared to the Bank and then addressed appropriately according to the severity and impact on personnel, assets and on overall project activities. The security focal person delegated at regional level report the incident occurred to the federal focal person as much as possible within 24 hours, then the federal focal person to the PIU or project coordinator. The project coordinator will directly report the incident or accident to the WB.

*District* administration at project target area is responsible to facilitate the occurrence of any security events report and support to project implementer, project staff, external suppliers and contractors.

Whenever the security risk is expected or identified the project implementation unit will use the existing government security forces to access better information and to safeguard the project staff and other project assets.

Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) will be prepared and signed (as needed) between the project and relevant government office which is responsible to deploy security forces by clearly indicating the roles and responsibilities of public security officers. The MoU binds public security officers to the project code of conduct and covers the rules on the use of force. Beyond ensuring security matters, the public security officers, by no means, will not dilute the basic human rights acceptable to the bank. In collaboration with relevant government security office, training will be conducted on how the public security officers will be disciplined for any wrongdoing and the policy on the use of force on project sites/activities.

**iv). Recovery**

After the incident and accident took place in the project areas, based on the information and report immediate action taken by using the nearby facility or any fast solution life will be saved by taking the affected staff to the hospital. The property or assets of the project will be saved as much as possible by using possible means through the structure of the government and other institution who have this capacity. The mitigation majors taken and the recovery situation will be evaluated for more better improvement.

**v). Training Plan**

Conduct awareness creation training for project staffs, experts of implementing sectors, district administration, government security bodies and other employee on types of risks that workers may face during project implementation and how to deal with the risks. Awareness creation training will include rules on the use of force, code of conduct, GBV/SEA and human rights protection and the awareness creation training will be conducted in collaboration with relevant stakeholders from government institutions of security and police commission. The training also will cover the WB security management system, incident reporting and identified types of security risks

**vi). Project security management structure**

Security Risk Management for the project lies under the oversight and responsibility of the project coordination unit and implementing directorate (PPD) at federal, regional and district level. The Federal level implementor plant protection directorate, regional bureaus plant protection sector/directorate/team and district Plant protection expert will work closely with the regional and local government security bodies under the overall direction, desert locust survey, control, supervision and other activities assisted by the government existing administration. Accordingly, the project will utilize existing government security structures of implementing sectors at federal regional, zone, district and kebele levels. Relevant focal persons will be delegated at federal and regional levels to facilitate communications related to security concerns together with the project coordinator or delegated PIU staff. It is anticipated that the project will not have security involvement over and above the existing government arrangements. The major scenarios that may require security involvement are:

* The contractor will be awarded for regional bases construction works at specific project sites located near to the areas where law enforcement operation is undertaking
* The material supply activities by private suppliers specifically into insecure sites
* The project staff movement for the purpose of technical support, follow up monitoring and evaluation
* Project resource and construction materials temporary stored at construction site and
* Project vehicles, sprayers, PPE and pesticides in front line bases closer to desert locust breeding sites in conditions that they may be exposed to non-government armed forces.

. The project coordinator and security focal persons will be responsible for this. Insecure project sites and activities may require the presence of public security personnel, which most likely to be arranged by the region, *district* and kebele government to accompany the overall project operation, material supply and staff movement.

The responsibility for security risk management of ELERP operation will be vested on the Project coordination unit (PIU) and federal, regional and *district level plant protection directorates of the Ministry of Agriculture* should ensure the safety and security of contracted workers and control operation materials at sub project implementation sites including reporting on any security concerns occurred at project implementation sites. The overall responsibility for overseeing project security rests on project coordinator and safeguard focal persons for each of the regions. In collaboration with administrative bodies, the PIU and MoA concerned directorate PPD at all levels will be responsible for coordinating the overall project management through the existing government structure in fulfilling security safeguards requirements. Specifically, the PIU coordination and project staff will be responsible for:

a). Undertaking site and activity specific security risk assessment and implementation of this Security Risk Management Plan;

b). As part of sub-project screening, undertake security risk assessment and recommend mitigation measures;

c) Ensure that security mitigation measures are included in sub-project ESMPs;  
d) Monitor potential security risks on sub-project sites together with the local government   
e) Provide training for concerned stakeholders to mitigate social risks of project workers and equipment including security risks;

f) Ensure that project Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) established for the project and implemented and that project workers are informed about the GRM procedure;

h) Report periodically to the World Bank on the implementation of the SMP.

## Table 6. . Summary of SMP

| **Risks** | **Management Plan** | **Responsible body** |
| --- | --- | --- |
| 1. Institutional instability affecting human and material safety as a result of law enforcement operation | * Undertake site specific security risk assessment to update security information * Staff movement in insecure areas will be accompanied with government security personnel when needed. * Provide awareness creation and capacity building training on security risk management for project workers, contractors, community workers, suppliers and other stakeholders working at areas with security problem * Pause project operations temporary in areas with significant security problem. Acceptable conditions for the resumption of activities will be agreed by the PIU, the MoA implementor and region bureaus and documented in advance. * Undergo plan revision and budget reallocation | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administrations and security offices at all level |
| 1. Insecure road transportation including access blockage to some project regions and districts | * Use alternative means of transportation, for example air transportation for project staff * Seek the support of government security personnel proportionate to the level of risk (regional special force, woreda police officers and kebele militia) for obligatory movements to security problem sites * Government security forces deployed for project use will operate as per an MoU signed with the project and be bound by project code of conduct and rules on the use of force. | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administration and security offices |
| 1. Robbery to project assets including office equipment, office furniture, cars and motor cycles etc | * Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas * Strengthening virtual communication options with region bureaus and project districts using standard connection options (internet and cell phone) which are within the scope of the project. * Strengthen physical security measures (fence, gate check Lock,) * Continuous information exchange with government security bodies * Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force) | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administration and security offices |
| 1. Theft to warehouse of chemicals, sprayers, construction materials at project site | * Strengthen physical security measures (fence, gate check, store lock…) * Assign additional security guard in collaboration with local administration (Region bureau, zone, PHC or district offices) | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administration and security offices |
| 1. Delay in procurement and construction material supply | * Assess and use alternatives including local markets * Coordination with government security bodies incase their engagement and support is needed while transporting construction materials from central market place and to construction sites | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administration and security offices |
| 1. Incident to project staff and project workers including physical beating and sexual harassment and GBV | * Awareness creation on GBV and social harassment for communities * Limit frequency of field travel to security risk areas * Access updated information on security issues before any movement into security risk areas * Report to and get preventive support from higher security officers (police and regional special force) | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices and administration and security offices |
| 1. Weak and ineffective  grievance redress  processes | Strengthening and awareness creation and training will be provided for Grievance Redress Committee | * PIU or coordinator, MoA PPD, Project regions and districts Agriculture bureaus/offices |

# 8. Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM)

Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) should be redressed by adopting proactive approach rather than reactive approach. The proactive approach addresses the factors responsible for emergence of grievance. In other words, management does not allow grievance causing situation to emerge.

But in reactive approach, a particular grievance gets redressed but the underlying cause continues to exist. Unless it is rooted out lock, stock and barrel, there cannot be any permanent solution.

**The following are the proactive methods of addressing grievances:**

**a. Exit Interview**

Information collected from the exiting employee on various aspects of working conditions forcing him to quit is supposed to be more credible than those expressed by the existing workers.

**b. Gripe Box System:**

Employees may be encouraged to drop anonymous complaints as they may fear that their identity may invite victimization especially when they complain against the management. This method is more appropriate when there is lack of trust and understanding between employees and their supervisors.

**c. Opinion Survey:**

Various surveys line morale survey, attitude survey, job satisfaction survey, grievance survey or comprehensive survey comprising all the above aspects, reveal vital inputs about the negative aspects of functioning of the organization. Since the survey is conducted by persons other than the supervisor and the respondents identify is not insisted upon, information collected is likely to be reliable.

**d. Meetings:**

Group meeting, periodical interviews, collective bargaining sessions, informal get-togethers may be used to collect information about grievances.

**e. Open-Door Policy:**

Under this policy any employee can lodge complaint or file his grievance with the manager designated for this purpose. The very objective of this policy is to encourage upward Communication.

Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP IV) has developed a grievance handling mechanism, which is to be applied for all activities, and which will be used for this ELERP as well. ELERP will conduct separate sessions at each desert locust affected districts to inform the affected communities about the desert locust control, expected impacts of the proposed chemical and safety measures to be observed, and to solicit inputs from the stakeholders. During the implementation of ELERP districts and Kebeles will maintain a complaint record database to enable complaint tracking and review and establish a complaint handling committee and involve district and Kebele grievance handling committees in grievance handling processes, for detail see Annex 1.

A Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM) is oriented toward providing solutions and incorporates the principles of transparency, accessibility, due diligence, and responsiveness. The locust response project will use the PSNP project grievance mechanism and in areas where PSNP is not available, the project will use the public grievance hearing mechanism. The project will also recognize customary and/or traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. The project will equally ensure that grievances related to GBV are recognized and referred to respective service providers based on a survivor-centered approach (that is, always based on the demands of survivors and ensuring confidentiality). Such grievances shall not be handled according to standard GRM procedures but by the district Women and Children Affairs Office or female GBV focal points to be selected and trained to provide basic referrals.

## Annex 1. Grievance Redressing Mechanism (GRM)

Under the ESF of the World Bank ESSs, Bank-supported projects are required to facilitate mechanisms that address concerns and grievances that arise in connection with a project. One of the key objectives of ESS 10 (Stakeholder Engagement and Information Disclosure) is ‘to provide project-affected parties with accessible and inclusive means to raise issues and grievances and allow borrowers to respond and manage such grievances. This Project GRM should facilitate the Project to respond to concerns and grievances of the project-affected parties related to the environmental and social performance of the project. The EELRP will provide mechanisms to receive and facilitate resolutions to such concerns. This section lays out the grievance redressing mechanisms (GRM) for this project.

As per World Bank standards, the GRM will be operated in addition to a separate GBV/SEA and Child Protection Risk Action Plan, which includes reporting and referral guidelines (see GBV/SEA and Child Abuse Action Plan). It will also operate in a addition to specific workers’ grievance redress mechanisms, which are laid out in the LMP.

The GRM are designed to capture the high potential for conflict in some remote area of the country. There is concern that there may be disagreements over local level planning and implementation processes. Furthermore, the project itself may cause grievances, or existing community and inter-community tensions may play out through the project. The source of grievances in regards to project implementation can also sometimes be the very nature local governance or power distribution itself.

It will therefore be key in the fragile environment of some part of the country to ensure that grievances and perceived injustices are handled by the project, and that the project aides mitigating general conflict stresses by channelling grievances that occur between people, groups, government actors and beneficiaries and project staff, NGOs, CSOs or contractors. Aggrieved parties need to be able to refer to institutions, instruments, methods and processes by which a resolution to a grievance is sought and provided. The GRM provides an effective avenue for expressing concerns, providing redress, and allowing for general feedback from community members.

The GRM aims to address concerns in a timely and transparent manner and effectively. It is readily accessible for all project-affected parties. It does not prevent access to judicial and administrative remedies. It is designed in a culturally appropriate way and is able to respond to all needs and concerns of project-affected parties.

**Assess and Clarify**

Through radio, mobile phones, community meetings, email and websites information about the Project and its sub-component activities will be publicly disclosed (see above).

The type of information disclosed includes details about the Project structure, activities, budgets, consultation and information disclosure plans (SEP), the Environmental and Social Commitment Plan (ESCP), the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF), activity-specific Environmental and Social Assessments (ESAs), activity-specific Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs), the GBV/SEA and child protection referral systems, as well as detailed information about the Project GRM.

Based on the information made available, aggrieved parties can decide whether they have a case to report or whether the available information clarifies their concern. This will allow the aggrieved party to decide on the appropriate next step in order to report a grievance, comment, or provide feedback to the Project.

The provision of multiple grievance channels allows an aggrieved party to select the most efficient institution, accessibility, circumvent partial stakeholders, and creates the ability to bypass channels that are not responsive.

**Intake, Acknowledge and Follow-Up**

Grievances received through the GRM reporting mechanisms will be taken in by the respective IP. The Hotline Operator reviews information received and transfers it to the respective IP; Community Project facilitators will file grievances and pass them to the respective IP at state or national level. Community facilitators will also man the help desks or be responsible for suggestion boxes. All cases received through these; the community facilitator reports to the IP. All cases will thereby be treated confidentially.

Incident reporting: Severe incidents (an incident that caused significant adverse effect on the environment, the affected communities, the public or workers, e.g. fatality, GBV, forced or child labor) will be reported by the IP - within 48 - to the PIU and the World Bank.

Where grievances are of sexual nature and can be categorized as GBV/SEA or child protection risk, the IP must handle the case appropriately, and refer the case to the GBV referral system, defined in the GBV/SEA and Child Abuse Action Plan.

For all other grievances, the respective IP will decide whether the grievance can be solved locally, with local authorities, implementers, NGOs, CSOs or contractors, and whether an investigation is required. The first ports of call will have in-depth knowledge of communal socio- political structures and will therefore be able to address the appropriate individuals, if the case can be solved at the local level.

At all times, the IP will provide feedback promptly to the aggrieved party, for example through the phone or through the community facilitator. Feedback is also communicated through stakeholder meetings and beneficiary meetings during Project activities. For sensitive issues, feedback is given to the concerned persons bilaterally.

Records of all feedback and grievances reported will be established by the IP. All feedback is documented and categorized for reporting and/ or follow-up if necessary. For all mechanisms, data will be captured in an excel spreadsheet. The information collected, where possible, should include the name of the person provided feedback, district, State, cooperating partner where applicable, project activity, and the nature of feedback or complaint.

**Verify, Investigate and Act**

The IP will investigate the claim within 5 working days and share findings with relevant stakeholders. Where an incident was reported, the IP will, in addition, follow the incident management protocol.

Where a negotiated grievance solution is required, the IP will invite the aggrieved party (or a representative) and decide on a solution, which is acceptable to both parties and allows for the case to be closed – based on the agreement of both parties.


After deciding a case, the IP has to provide an appeals mechanism to the aggrieved party, which is constituted through the PIU. This is important in cases in which the aggrieved party is dissatisfied with the solution provided by the IP. In these instances, the PIU will step in and provide an appeals mechanism. The appeal should be sent to the PIU directly (a phone number will be provided), where it will be reviewed by the PMU Risk Management Unit and will be decided on jointly with the Head of the PIU. Where aggrieved parties are dissatisfied with the response of the PIU, they can report cases directly to the World Bank (see below).

**Monitor, Evaluate and Feedback**

The IP will provide first feedback on the case to the aggrieved party within one week, if the case was not filed anonymously. Further feedback and action will depend on the nature of the case, and whether cases are decided upon within the respective IP. The IP will show to the PIU that action has been taken within a reasonable amount of time.

Most importantly, all cases filed need to be logged and monitored by the IP. The IP will analyse all complaints and feedback on a quarterly basis, and share a synthesis report of the analysis with the PIU.

**ELERP Grievance Redress Mechanisms Flowchart**



**Monitoring and Reporting of GRM**

The PIU, specifically the Social Specialist, will be responsible for the monitoring of the availability and implementation of the GRM by all IPs. The Specialist will include the GRM into his supervision and monitoring missions to the field and conduct spot checks in regards to its implementation, or, where access is difficult recruit IVA to do so.

IPs will provide analytical synthesis reports on a quarterly basis to the PIU, which include the number, status and nature of grievances. These reports will form the basis of all regular reports from the PIU to the World Bank.

IPs will further provide an excel sheet summary of the feedback and grievances reported, which will be linked to the Project’s Management Information System (MIS) and to the M&E Results Framework. They will further maintain a documented record of stakeholder engagements, including a description of the stakeholders consulted, a summary of the feedback/grievances received during community consultations.

The PIU will further extract lessons learnt from the GRM and implement analysis on the overall grievances, and share them with all IPs.

**WB’s Grievance Redress Service (GRS)**

Communities and individuals who believe that they are adversely affected by a World Bank supported project may submit complaints to existing project-level grievance redress mechanisms or the WB’s Grievance Redress Service (GRS). The GRS ensures that complaints received are promptly reviewed in order to address project-related concerns. Project affected communities and individuals may submit their complaint to the WB’s independent Inspection Panel which determines whether harm occurred, or could occur, as a result of WB non-compliance with its policies and procedures. Complaints may be submitted at any time after concerns have been brought directly to the World Bank's attention, and Bank Management has been given an opportunity to respond. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank’s corporate Grievance Redress Service (GRS), please visit http://www.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/products-and-services/grievance-redress-service. For information on how to submit complaints to the World Bank Inspection Panel, please visit www.inspectionpanel.org